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Introduction
The fact that anarchist ideas in the nineteenth century developed within a culturally diverse and geographically diffuse group of autodidacts and political revolutionaries rather than professional philosophers may go some way toward explaining their eclectic and unorthodox character. Motivated by a common disgust with bourgeois thought and its failure to bring clarity to the most important social and political issues of the day, anarchist intellectuals such as Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin pursued alternative ways of thinking that yielded similar conclusions about freedom, equality, and justice. Although these conclusions gradually coalesced into a unique political philosophy predicated on the rejection of capitalism, organized religion, and the state, anarchists arrived at them by way of various routes with different starting points. This chapter explores a few of these intellectual trajectories in the broader context of nineteenth-century thought.
The first section, which focuses on social ontology, examines various classical anarchist approaches to the relationship between individual and society. The second section discusses questions of method and epistemology, exploring how classical anarchists drew upon the concepts and frameworks of their more illustrious forebears and contemporaries to develop, among other things, an oddly post-modern view of history. The third and final section considers the role played by the foregoing in the development of core anarchist concepts during the period.

Society and Social ontology
Within anarchist thought in the classical period (arguably from Proudhon to Kropotkin), there was a clear disjuncture in the way in which writers understood the ontology of politics. Who or what is the proper locus of moral worth: individuals or society? Whence do our ideas and moral inclinations originate: from within or without? These are questions of ontology—questions that precede epistemology precisely because the latter presupposes ontological positions. Significantly, answers to these questions are also unavoidably political. To assert the sanctity of the individual and of free will and free thought might sound revolutionary, but it was decidedly counter-revolutionary in the ferment of the Jacobin Terror, where the murderous defense of the good of the whole and the moral inconsequence of the individual spread fear through the whole of Europe. Throughout the nineteenth century we see most anarchists trying to walk a tightrope between the demands of community and individuality, attempting to establish either a creative balance (Proudhon) or else a revolutionary synthesis (Bakunin) between them.
Some of the most important philosophical contact points—chief among them Smith, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, Comte, and Hegel—will be familiar to students of politics and philosophy. Although all of these thinkers place the individual, rational, emotive, and purposive at the core of their social philosophies to varying degrees, they nonetheless assign different weights to the relative needs of society against their underlying ontological commitments to the individual. For example, Auguste Comte, the father of sociology and a key developer of positivism, was a staunch materialist who believed that free will was a myth and that historical and material processes of biology, psychology, technology governed the future.​[1]​ For Comte, ordinary individuals have no role to play in these processes. In their place, “Priest Scientists” rule over society atop a rigid social pyramid in which the laborers at the bottom are mere thralls to forces beyond their control. Kant, in contrast, believed that the French Revolution had ushered in a new era of rights and progress in which all human beings are recognized as morally equal. For Kant, it is the capacity for reason, quite distinct from the material workings of the universe, that invests individuals with free will and sanctifies them as ends in themselves. Individual human wills, he further contended, would converge across historical time into a rational “kingdom of ends” and usher in a perpetual peace.​[2]​  
Although Kant’s was an explicitly sexist political philosophy​[3]​ and was not widely taken up by revolutionary theorists, his ideas were available through various unofficial translations to Comte and his later French translator, Joseph Tissot, was a good friend of Proudhon’s. Likewise, Kant’s ideas were central to Hegel’s own intellectual development and, through Hegel, to Bakunin as well. Like all natural scientists of the nineteenth century, Kropotkin was surely familiar with Comte’s positivism, though he would have found little difficulty in distancing his own politics from those espoused in Comte’s naturalist positivism. Kropotkin’s planned decentralization, after all, could not have been further from Comte’s technocratic pyramidal society, even if their mutual rejection of hidden hand economics was plain.​[4]​ It is in this way that these ideas percolated down through to the revolutionaries. In view of their audience and the populist style of their writing, thinkers like Proudhon and Bakunin rarely referenced writers like Kant and Comte directly. Following the failures of the Utopian Socialists, Comte in particular would have been considered counter-revolutionary, which is why Marx references him so rarely. Nevertheless, we see in classical, nineteenth century anarchist writings concerted attempts to think through basic philosophical questions for a revolutionary purpose. 
Following Rousseau and Hegel, Bakunin, Proudhon, Kropotkin and others argued that moral conscience is innate in human beings.​[5]​ Most tried to find some way of balancing this innate conscience with the reality of social norms and the outcomes of individual rational deliberation. The more explicitly Hegelian anarchists, from Bakunin onwards, were more likely to assume a certain cultural vitalism, wherein a people’s identity is a function of the land they inhabit and cultural traditions they practice as well as the material forms of oppression they experience. Kropotkin, by contrast, argued that a sensibility towards mutual aid was a factor of human evolution and central to species development.  
There were three key focal points of critique that distinguished anarchists from their contemporaries. On the question of religion, the state, and capitalism, anarchists took lines that were uncompromisingly distinct. Let’s take these in turn. Ontological questions were predominantly theological questions in the nineteenth century and ontological arguments for or against the existence of God were typically premised on a commitment to some other primary value—for example reason. It is not hard to see how the scope of such arguments quickly broadened to the nature of existence itself, for if the existence of God is open to rational scrutiny, the same is true in principle of the existence of objects, of the conscience, of ideas, and so forth. The converse, of course, is that due to the proximity of ontological arguments to theology, radical enlightenment philosophers tended to avoid it. Consequently, arguments about social reality were couched in very different terms. For example, Kant rejected ontological arguments on empiricist and rationalist grounds, preferring to make a distinction between phenomena and noumena.​[6]​ Although Kantian philosophy—including its moral deontology—implied a host of ontological assumptions, its foremost emphasis is epistemological in character. 
Much of Proudhon’s System of Economical Contradictions and On the Creation of Order in Humanity is given over to this discussion.​[7]​ Bakunin’s God and the State likewise draws parallels between religious and political forms of subordination. In the intervening years, however, Feuerbach’s anthropological account of religion had risen to prominence and, in so doing, shifted the focus of ontological argument from the question of God’s existence or non-existence to how the concept of God serves as an expression of human community. The nature of the social, accordingly, became a primary emphasis of philosophical debate. During the restoration period (1815-1830s), the religious counter-revolution (particularly in France) began to stress the transcendent nature of religious and political community, the role of war in “pruning the human tree” (Hegel), and the extent to which religious ideas give permanence and order to society. 
It is not difficult to see how the individual might drop out of such an analysis or, indeed, how problematic it might be to justify an individualist ontology. But this was just one way in which the relationship between the individual and the collective came to be framed. Another was sundry debates that unfolded between idealists and materialists. Filtered through Comte’s materialist positivism, Hume’s empiricism demanded that only brute facts and observable material or efficient causes could be said to be real, in which case ideas are only responses to external stimuli and internal biological impulses. Though rarely acknowledged, the influence of Comte is plain in Marx’s contention that modes of consciousness are a function of the material conditions of production and that classes rather than individuals are the proper object of socialist analysis. 
The writings of the anarchists reflect and in some ways seek to resolve the binary oppositions that characterize nineteenth century thought. For example, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon believed that what distinguishes the human from the non-human is both its social nature as well as its capacity for intelligent productive activity (i.e., work).​[8]​ Because sociability and productivity are both defining features of the human speciesm, the study of society must be approached from the fundamental fact of labor as an originally human experience. The division of work in an emergent industrial society introduces a new element which Proudhon calls “collective force”—namely, the association and simultaneity of productive tasks. Collective force has a corresponding ideal, or cognitive aspect, which Proudhon terms “collective reason.”​[9]​ Both are manifested in the purposeful and collaborative enterprises of individuals within groups and become real insofar as they possess causal power within society. While groups take innumerable forms, from football clubs to rock groups, Proudhon considers the social institution of work to be of primary importance. Work is not only productive of things, but also of people; collaborative work within and between groups and individuals—the learning on which it depends and the division of social labor it precipitates—is what makes society and individuals what they are. Individual existence cannot be understood apart from the cooperative nature of work as a defining feature of the human species, especially in industrial societies. It is from this starting point that Proudhon arrives at a critique of capitalist exploitation as a private appropriation of collective labor. This perspective entails a moral judgement regarding capitalist society: since collective production is the basis of society, social institutions that work toward private appropriation (such as the State or capitalist enterprises) should be considered immoral. The same is true of withdrawing surplus from cooperative enterprises, democratic institutions, and anything else that affirms the collective nature of the wealth of society for the sake of private interests.
Mass labor unions did not exist during Proudhon’s lifetime. Rather, worker groups organized through guilds and pursued trade representation in government assemblies. Proudhon never saw the mass unions that would come to dominate working class politics within 20 years of his death in 1865. Bakunin, on the other hand, was a key member of the International Workingmens Association (or “First International”), which was heavily populated by Proudhonists and those who survived the massacre of the Paris Commune in 1871. As labor militancy became increasingly pronounced in the 1870s, Bakunin and his contemporaries took a far more explicitly collectivist approach to social ontology. The former’s indebtedness to Hegel played a significant role in this regard. Although he follows Proudhon in regarding individual freedom as the crowning achievement of human development, Bakunin conceives the individual in Hegelian terms as fundamentally belonging to a natural and social whole that produces and determines the individual itself. 
For Bakunin, as for Hegel, there is no real contradiction between the individual and society. Like Comte, moreover, Bakunin understands the social production of the individual in strictly biological terms. Whatever a particular individual is depends upon the constitutive traits of the human species as well as the nature of the concrete society to which he or she belongs. Bakunin and Proudhon both believe that there is an essential continuity between humanity and nature insofar as humans are at bottom animals with the ability to think, speak, work, and, most importantly, rebel against injustice.​[10]​ For this reason, Bakunin asserts that the conditions for individual development are biological and social, that the individual is a product of these conditions—i.e., that he or she is strongly (not absolutely) determined by them—and therefore that the very idea of individuals existing apart from the regularity of natural or social determination is at best abstraction, providing as it does the mere abstract promise (rather than the concrete reality) of a fully-developed human being. 
Rousseau’s impact on nineteenth century anarchism is also undeniable. His account of the pristine primitive state and the corrupting influence of arbitrary power were hugely important tropes, as was his neo-Platonic analysis of the primordial nature of human character and the role of social education in bringing about its fullest expression. Ideas such as these had a clear influence on Bakunin’s Pan-Slavism as well as Proudhon’s account of social justice, inter alia. At the same time, Bakunin formulated what is arguably one of the strongest and most thorough critiques of Rousseau’s political philosophy. Following Proudhon’s lead, he takes an aggressive stance against the idealist notion of “free will” and the concept of the “social contract,” the latter of which he regards as historically false as well as politically inconsistent with its promises of freedom.​[11]​ Whereas Rousseau derives the obligation to “force people to be free” from the nature of the ideal political union, for Bakunin it is precisely the fact that despotisms can be justified in the interests of any ideal political community that makes the state so dangerous. This critique of Rousseau is a central element of classical anarchist conceptions of freedom (not “natural” or “given” but historical) and political society (not an agreement of free individuals, but a specific mode of organizing power socially). 
Finally, let’s turn to the question of patriarchy and sexism in nineteenth century anarchism to see what it illuminates vis-à-vis anarchist philosophy. It goes without saying that nineteenth century anarchist thought was predominantly masculinist and tended to reflect patriarchal values and hierarchies. Proudhon, for example, was quite convinced that while men alone had the ability to voluntarily take on public roles that shape communities while simultaneously allowing themselves to be shaped in turn.​[12]​ Women’s roles, in contrast, are entirely passive and determined by their secondary natures. In uncritically accepting the standard science of the time, Proudhon believed that women had no active role in conception and, as such, were merely receptacles.​[13]​ Bakunin, in contrast, held that the general liberation of humankind from oppression necessarily implied the emancipation of women. In both his theoretical writings as well as the political programs various revolutionary organizations he founded, he repeatedly emphasized the need for social, political, and economic equality between men and women, which follows from his notion that real freedom must be understood as the fullest possible development of human faculties.​[14]​ In short, the positions vis-à-vis women that individual anarchists derived from the ontologies discussed in this section varied. Although most, like Proudhon’s, were deeply at odds with other aspects of classical anarchism, some, such as Bakunin’s, were much more consistent with anarchism’s liberatory ideal. 

Epistemology and Methodology
The Enlightenment was an age of positive science that regarded facts directly accessible to the senses—not beliefs born of inherited intuition and habit—as the sine qua non of inquiry. There is no question that this was a period in the history In spite of this empiricism, or perhaps because of it, philosophy was seen as a precondition and foundation for science, a necessary under-laborer in the effort to reorient the scientific endeavor and debunk the dictates of religion. Although thinkers like Hume and Comte were not scientists in the conventional sense, their philosophical enterprises were enormously relevant to the development of scientific theory and practice. As such, it should come as no surprise that Proudhon, Kropotkin and Bakunin routinely evoked ideas of scientists and scientific thinkers to defend and uphold their claims, albeit in different ways and for different reasons. The trained natural scientist Kropotkin, for example, uses the same precise, considered tone and inductive methodology in his later anarchist writings that characterized his early scientific studies. This is particularly evident in The Conquest of Bread, which draws upon contemporary science in its argument for the viability of collective modes of economic organization and, by extension, of an anarchist-communist society.​[15]​ 
Proudhon was also a defender of positive science who was so successful in popularizing Comte’s work that the latter attempted to recruit him as one of his “Priest Scientists” in the late 1850s. Althouhg he rebuffed Comte—considering him an insufferable pedant whose social philosophy was an affront to science and reason​[16]​—Proudhon, like John Stuart Mill and other leading intellectuals of that time, was fascinated by Comte’s method and greatly admired the depth and insights of his research. It has been argued that much of Proudhon’s output from 1858 onwards can be read as an indirect engagement with Comte’s social philosophy.​[17]​ Like Comte, Proudhon sought to integrate the social and the natural sciences, arguing that our natural biological impulses interact with our material environment. Unlike Comte, Proudhon strongly affirmed the existence of free will (albeit within the relative constraints of historical and social context) which, like Kant, he understood chiefly in terms of the human capacity for reason. 
At the same time, there are clear differences between the ideas of Bakunin and Proudhon on the one hand and Kropotkin on the other. The fact that Proudhon was a neo-Kantian and Bakunin a neo-Hegelian is important both methodologically and politically. Although both were schooled in the reigning dialectial philosophy of the day, Bakunin follows Hegel, Comte, and Marx in understanding the dialectic as a process in which the conditions of the emergent property are given in their antecedent positioning. This implies that both concepts and history are produced by the logical and material contradictions that arise in their positioning. The thesis and antithesis are not contingently related; their harmonization presupposes a new synthesis that is an extension of that harmonization itself rather than a distinct other. On this basis, Comte’s theory of history (which Marx adapted) infers that the order of philosophical time is “past, future, present” insofar as what emerges in the future is given in the past. ​[18]​ Proudhon rejected this formulation—partly because of misunderstanding, but also because of the predominantly Kantian roots of his ideas. For Proudhon the synthesis is chimerical insofar as thesis and antithesis subsist in perpetual “antinomy.”​[19]​ What changes are the terms, or definitions the terms, that comprise that antinomy. There is is no synthesis of good and evil, or authority and liberty, to be found in the future—only re-defined or altogether different terms and a new equilibrium between the two crafted in historical context. Although Proudhon believes one can learn from the past for the future, he does not consider the future is given and denies that there is a necessary “truth” that emerges from the given poles of the dialectic. All we find are temporary equilibria.  
As is well known, the Young Hegelian critique of Hegel consisted in materializing the process of aufhebung by demonstrating that material contradictions within concrete social forms rather than ideas are what generate change. It is difficult to pigeonhole classical anarchists as either philosophically materialist or idealist. Virtually all of them understood capitalism as a material mode of production and most agreed with Marx that false ideas were as central to the perpetuation of the capitalism as brute force. Where Proudhon differed was in developing what he called “ideo-realism,” a position which understands ideas as having the same ontological status as the material forces surrounding us.​[20]​ It follows, accordingly, that the existence of ideas—no less than their potency as political or social forces—is not simply reducible to the existence ofan underlying material reality. 
In On Justice, Proudhon (1990) argues that justice is the both the cause and cumulative effect of social change, which he describes as both a material as well as an ideal process.​[21]​ It follows that injustice in any form can only be recognized by a process of rational reflection coupled with direct, empirical experience. For Bakunin, in contrast, human ideas are protean, universal, and routinely subjugated by countervailing forces of injustice. Like Rousseau and Hegel, Bakunin was quicker to argue that ideas are corrupted by the prevailing social order—in which case the destruction of which the latter serves as a condition of possibility for the emergence of truth.​[22]​ Matter are still more complicated with Kropotkin, for whom natural human proclivities are continually channeled through the force of existing institutions rather than waiting to be released in some future moment. On his view, human beings routinely resort to mutual aid regardless of the social order they inhabit, but social orders can be developed to better accentuate that natural impulse (as in the case of communism).​[23]​ Whereas Proudhon’s ontological starting point results in an emphasis on right and justice, those of Bakunin or Kropotkin lead more directly to the path of revolutionary syndicalism. 

Philosophy of History 
The revolutionary ferment of the nineteenth century and the historical rupture it represented would have made it difficult if not impossible for an anarchist at this time to not engage with the philosophy of history. Was the French Revolution a radical departure from the norm or not? Was progress possible? Was the past something to leave behind or a guide to our future? It is well known that Comte’s materialism no less than Kant’s rationalist idealism implied processes of change and historical progress. Both relied on secularized theodicies, or tales of how good could be borne of evil. After all, how could a time in which such battles were fought and so many died be rationalized except in terms of their historically providential form? To think otherwise would be to retreat into the conservative ahistoricism of the Catholic Theocrat Joseph de Maistre, or to believe that human life was only perfectible in this lifetime and that history itself extended no further. The break from this latter Aristotelian line was as important as the former, with most agreeing with Kant that the persistence and change of social institutions could only be accounted for in trans-generational terms, and likewise that the perfectibility of both institutions and of humanity itself, though impossible today, was all but inevitable in the fullness of time. This was the major trope of the Enlightenment and is invariably replicated in anarchist thinking. 
Philosophies of history, right up to the mid-twentieth century, tended to make strong teleological claims according to which history had a purpose and an end point that account for its vagaries and give shape to what would otherwise seem random. During the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, philosophers sought to secularize religious theodicy to this end. Rousseau, Kant, and others may be seen as trying to show how good could come from evil, and how history in its fullness has a purpose even if this is only distantly visible. While Kant and Rousseau may have been advisedly circumspect, Comte was less so. For him, the material forces of history rearranged its logical order. No longer should we think in terms of past, present and future, for the future is always and already disclosed in the material structures of the past. The anarchists were not so confident. Like Kant and Rousseau, they sought to reclaim individual and collective rational agency from the clutches of either Aristotelian or neo-Platonic teleology, but they were also vocal critics of Comte and later of Marx’s materialist determinism. How then did these writers think about history? 
Proudhon had what may be described as a Heraclitean account of history.​[24]​ Heraclitus is famous for his aphorism that “one cannot step in the same river twice,” meaning that constant flux is our lot and, thus, that there is no necessary form to the path of history. This is in contrast to Platonists who argued that history and society were fixed in constant revolution (in the sense of turning and repetition) due to the natural forms humans and social stratification takes. How we understand history, accordingly, is shaped fundamentally by how we understand ourselves and our relations to one another. It comes as no surprise that anarchists have a particular take on this. 
For Proudhoun, the core concepts were progress and justice, and the subject of his key case study from the latter part of his life, was war and peace.​[25]​ Proudhon was typical for his age in this respect, given that most of its important historical and philosophical writings were similarly concerned with war. Unlike his contemporaries, however, Proudhon was not concerned to discover how human progress was borne of our irrational and malign human natures; he does not follow the likes of Kant, Rousseau, Hobbes, Smith by formulating a theodicy. Rather, Proudhon argued that conceptions of justice and right emerge from conflict, and that progress was less about future events somehow exhibiting “better” characteristics than the past and more about the discovery of ways to liberate social forces such that the future would be open for all to design. Modern war, he argued, put a stop to this through the industrialization of the modes of destruction, the monopolization of force by the state, and the militarization of the state and society through state-led armaments projects and the development of standing armies.​[26]​ Whereas statesmen like Louis Napoleaon III and later Bismarck acclaimed these processes as the pinnacle of human development, Proudhon contended that they would curtail the free movement of social forces and limit the freedom of groups to make and unmake society anew. For Proudhon, reanimating the central social antagonism through the transformation of work and the division and collectivization of labor required the liberation of the collective forces of society had to be given free reign. In an age of militarization this was unlikely.  
A key concept in Kropotkin’s theory of history is that of revolution, which he defines as “…a swift overthrow, in a few years, of institutions which have taken centuries to root in the soil, and seem so fixed and immovable that even the most ardent reformers hardly dare to attack them in their writings.”​[27]​ He continues:
A revolution is infinitely more than a series of insurrections in town and country. It is more than a simple struggle between parties, however sanguinary; more than mere street-fighting, and much more than a mere change of government, such as was made in France in 1830 and 1848… It is the fall, the crumbling away in a brief period, of all that up to that time composed the essence of social, religious, political and economic life in a nation. It means the subversion of acquired ideas and of accepted notions concerning each of the complex institutions and relations of the human herd.
In short, it is the birth of completely new ideas concerning the manifold links in citizenship—conceptions which soon become realities, and then begin to spread among the neighboring nations, convulsing the world and giving to the succeeding age its watchword, its problems, its science, its lines of economic, political and moral development.​[28]​
For Kropotkin, then, the most relevant historical events represent the culmination of a process in which intellectual, economic, and political forces at play pave the way for a quick, radical, and epoch-making period of revolution. Although Kropotkin wrote about history on several occasions, including in his renowned The State: Its Historic Role (1898), his true historical masterpiece is The Great French Revolution, 1789-1793 (1909). Initiating a new approach to  history that we would now call “history from below,” the text provides an account of the revolutionary role of the popular classes (i.e., the urban proletariat and the peasantry) in the under the direction of, but ultimately independently of, the bourgeoisie.
Kropotkin’s concept of rapid and radical social transformation that emerges when development is hindered by an outmoded intellectual, economic, or political regimis is intertwined with his understanding of evolution. Although several accounts argue that this understanding amounts to a theory of steady progress, a closer reading of his main work on the subject, Mutual Aid (1989), shows that Kropotkin thought of evolution as perpetual change rather than teleological progress and that he assigned a crucial role to human agency in the actualization of what is biologically and socially potential in a determined environment. For him, “revolution is a vitalising process” carried out by the oppressed and exploited classes “that complete[s] the work of evolution.”​[29]​ The emphasis he placed on the historic role of counterrevolution during the process of the Great French Revolution, as well as on the corruption of free cities with the emergence of the modern State, bespeakr a notion of historical progress deeply rooted in the struggles between classes and nations rather than in a optimistic natural tendency towards the good. In brief, Kropotkin believed that while human societies have an inherent tendency towards modification, revolutions are the best method to actually change them. This implies a degree of historical uncertainty, or at least the impossibility of asserting a predetermined historical teleology. Despite what he considered a natural tendency toward anarchy as expressed in the role of mutual aid in the evolution of species and human beings in particular, Kropotkin understood this tendency as a possibility—not as an inevitable, predictable fact of history. The key is the purposive actions of peoples and an appreciation of the structures that inhibit them.​[30]​
Bakunin conceives of history as an immanent process in the development of the totality of nature. There is no teleological end in the Kantian sense of an external ideal toward which history is moving but which cannot be achieved, nor is there a predetermined way to understand the stages of history through which human societies must necessarily go. Rather, the analysis of human history reveals that it must be understood as the practical realization of freedom. As Bakunin puts it, “Whatever lives... tends to realize itself in the fullness of its being.”​[31]​ Human society is a product of the development of nature, and so there is a continuity between nature and society, but with human species and human history appears a new phenomenon: freedom. If work and science allow human beings to reach a state of humanity, liberating themselves from the pressures of their natural surroundings and their own animality, it is the instinct of rebellion that allows them to be emancipated from the impositions of authoritarian social arrangements. The natural history of human beings is the history of their transcending their most primitive animal existence through thought, language and work and is continued in their social history as the revolutionary overcoming of unjust social arrangements.​[32]​ Since the social and political institutions of any given class society are simply products of the confrontations between heterogeneous and antagonistic social forces, the transformation of this order is historically dependent upon the balance of such forces. Human history, then, is the history of the struggles towards social emancipation from exploitation and oppression.

Freedom
How do these prior commitments shape the philosophies of freedom developed at this time? Heirs to a republican tradition based on the love of liberty and hatred of slavery as well as socialist perspective based on a critique of the wage slavery and modern forms of serfdom, anarchist thinkers in the nineteenth century adopted both a negative and a positive account of freedom. Instead of conceiving these accounts as essentially contradictory, they recognized that real freedom was predicated on both negative and positive conditions. Because some anarchists were ontologically realist, epistemologically eclectic, and believed history was open, they could not adopt a strong positive account of freedom. Rather, they invariably saw freedom in negative and largely republican terms as the freedom from the domination, whether arbitrary or simply possible, of one set of people by another. As heirs to a radical republican tradition, anarchists generalized the republican critique of slavery and monarchical despotism across a range of social institutions—e.g., capitalism, nationalism, colonialism, and imperialism—all of which had the potential for arbitrary domination to the extent that they denied people direct control over their lives and wellbeing. Egoism, no less than the arbitrary domination of the group, was denounced by individualist and collectivist anarchists alike. The problem in both accounts is that unless the rights and prerogatives of the individuals and community were balanced by democratic procedures, public discourse, and the equalization of material conditions, the tendency of one to dominate the other would be inevitable and deleterious to the full flourishing of both. 
Two different but complementary accounts of freedom are often run together. Whereas positive accounts of freedom are articulated in terms of full and equal participation, negative accounts emphasize the absence of key constraints that enabled indivdiuals and groups to devise and pursue their own understanding of the good. It is only in the absence of arbitrary domination that full freedom of choice concerning the particular intuitional means for realizing one’s preferred version of the good can be realized. Most anarchists were closer to virtue ethicists than utilitarians or Kantian deontologists in denying hat the greatest good could be determined in advance and grounded on universal ontological or epistemological foundations. Proudhon famously rejected Marx’s overtures in the 1840s precisely because he didn’t feel that shutting down alternative visions of the good with reference to one set of scientific or philosophical principles was conducive to freedom. Proudhon also disavowed deontological accounts that equated freedom adherence to rules or principles. It is not reason alone that gives rise to the principles of justice; rather, experience, intuition and the demands of circumstance all play a role in issuing a telling compromise. This is why Proudhon believed there to be a fundamental congruence between ends and means—or what today’s anarchists call prefiguration. 
For nearly all anarchists, the workplace is the principal context within which the good is pursued and realized. Auto-gestion, or worker self-management, was the living incarnation of the social philosophy of the anarchists of the nineteenth century, and today. It is at work that we manage those activities that are at once necessary and communal, individual and translocal.  Social anarchists like Kropotkin developed an evolutionary account of ethics, one that understood the development of the concept of good in historical terms. Different types of communities formulate competing conceptions of the good in order to galvanize those communities in their struggle for survival—an ability that was taken away from them in the advent of states and modern capitalism and which anarcho-communism hoped to reacquire. For Kropotkin and Proudhon, it is precisely because individuality emerges from within complex groups that attempts to derive conceptions of the good from anything but the immanent development of both are tantamount to proclaiming that good is not within the grasp of ordinary people to realize or to shape. Rationalists, positivists, and philosophers tout court often argued that only those possessed of special knowledge or insight could adequately divine the principles and foundations of right moral action. Taking this ability away from peoples and divorcing it from its social context constituted disempowerment and the imposition of arbitrary domination. 
The foregoing explains why many nineteenth century anarchists believed in the liberatory praxis of nationalism, particularly in anti-colonial contexts such as the Pan-Slavic struggle or the resistance of the Irish, Indians, amd Algerians to European occupation. Proudhon, for example, argued that attempt to create a unified Italy would prove deleterious to the regional and provincial autonomy of the cities and towns, especially as concerns their identities and customs, and that the imposition of an authoritarian bourgeoisie system of rule would only exacerbate this. It was for this reason that he endorsed federalism and worker self-management in Italy as antidotes to the monarchist Unitarianism that seemed to be galvanizing republican opinion in France. 
For Bakunin, individual freedom must be understood in the context of the natural and social history of the human species from a materialist point of view. Freedom as such is not a pre-social individual property but a historical outcome “emerging from society as the necessary consequence of the collective development of mankind,”​[33]​ the basic elements of which include thought, language, labor and rebellion. Since life in society is a necessary condition for all these elements, Bakunin and other anarchists considered the notion of individuals existing before society (let alone formulating conceptions of the good independently of social interaction) to be absurd. Society, they believed, is what makes individual freedom possible. 
Individual interdependence in society is not understood as interference with or obstruction of freedom. Since individuals are produced by nature and society as a complex and interconnected whole, “free will” in the sense of a completely self-determined will is a mere abstraction. Real individuals are only relatively autonomous. In this sense, freedom is not a natural pre-social trait of individuals but a historical conquest of society by collective means; it is a social fact that exists effectively only in community and in the social relations that facilitate the production of fully-developed individuals. This entails a notion of freedom that includes negative (or subjective) as well as positive (or objective) dimensions.​[34]​ 
For Bakunin, the subjective condition for freedom is autonomy—i.e., the ability to determine one’s own actions independently of the will of other individuals or groups. Historically, this existence and nature of of this ability depends strongly on social context. Within complex systems of domination such as capitalism, patriarchy, and the state, it is severely reduced or even nullified, particularly for the working class and other oppressed groups. Thus, autonomy necessarily requires a social order that permits and enables allowing and enabling it. In addition to subjective or negative freedom, anarchists also believe that there is a positive or objective condition for freedom—namely, the full development and enjoyment of all the physical, intellectual, and moral faculties of each individual. Freedom, accordingly, is not an unconditioned, a-social, a-historical principle inherent in individuals regardless of their situation; it is a practical matter that requires their having equal access to the means of satisfying basic needs. 
Kropotkin also recognized that freedom depends on objective conditions of economic well-being and political liberty and believed that a classless and stateless society was the only guarantee of an individual’s full development. In the place of individualism—which he considered “an impoverishment of individuality, or in any case the denial of what is necessary for obtaining the most complete flowering of the individual”—Kropotkin argued for a more genuine notion of individuality "which attains the greatest individual development possible through practicing the highest communist sociability in what concerns both its primordial needs and its relationships with others in general.”​[35]​ In order to achieve this goal, the exploitative and authoritarian society had to be transformed into one that marshals production in the service of the cooperative satisfaction of individual and social needs. 

Conclusion: Rethinking the Nineteenth Century
In this chapter we have sought to situate anarchist ideas in the broad political and intellectual context of the long nineteenth century. Although we have been compelled by necessity to sacrifice depth for breadth, we have nonetheless advanced four claims which, we hope, will invite further investigation from readers: first, that nineteenth century anarchists did not subscribe to a uniform set of ontological assumpions; second, that they exhibited a strong tendency toward epistemological pluralism; third that they were historicists who understood social transformations as complex processes involving both evolution as well as revolution; and finally, that they understood freedom both in negative, subjective terms as well as positive objective terms. 
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